Preventing Corruption in Asia: Institutional Design and Policy Capacity by Ting Gong & Stephen K. Ma

Author:Ting Gong & Stephen K. Ma [Gong, Ting & Ma, Stephen K.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Social Science, Ethnic Studies, General
ISBN: 9780415484084
Google: tlE-vgAACAAJ
Amazon: B008SA43K2
Barnesnoble: B008SA43K2
Goodreads: 20217018
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2009-01-15T12:52:10+00:00

Group 3: Oligarchs and Clans

Bangladesh

India

Malaysia

Nepal

Pakistan

Philippines

Sri Lanka

Thailand

Group 4: Official Moguls

China

Indonesia

Myanmar

Source: Johnston (2005: Ch. 3).

Blechinger (1999: 57) has described Japan’s party–business links as a kind of mutual services agreement, with the LDP dealing in access and business funding party operations. Trading in influence at high levels required a zoku—a network or political tribe. A zoku linked Diet members with a particular policy or economic sector to businesses and bureaucrats; some zoku members became virtual industry spokespersons (Johnson 1995; Blechinger 2000). Modified one-party politics created just enough political competition to make it worthwhile to put up cash to keep the LDP in power, and a near-monopoly over access that gave factional leaders leverage over donors. Corruption did not prevent a four-decade economic miracle; indeed, it fed upon prosperity. But Influence Markets have had significant political costs, aggravating the factional splits that brought the LDP down, temporarily, in 1993 and perhaps contributing to Japan’s ineffective economic adaptations following the burst of the late-1980s bubble.

Korea: “money politics” and Elite Cartel dominance

Korea’s corruption outwardly resembles the “money politics” seen in Japan. Large payments by businesses to political elites—both as “contributions” to parties or foundations and as outright bribes—for years bought favorable access to credit and major policy favors. But Korea’s corruption was more centralized within top levels of the state, and was less a quid pro quo system than a continuous incentive flow supporting an elite network (Moran 1999; Steinberg 2000: 203–38). Those networks included presidents, their families, and their entourages; heads of the chaebols (huge family-controlled conglomerates); bureaucrats, and military and business leaders. Weakness in civil society and state institutions, and traditional attitudes toward authority, facilitated this style; but so did its ability, from the mid-1970s onwards, to deliver rising living standards on a breathtaking scale.

“Money politics” was simple in important respects: chaebols made payments to political leaders, their parties, or their pet charities. During the 1980s and early 1990s, such contributions ran as large as 22 percent of net profits (Woo 1991: 9). This immense cash flow underwrote party and legislative organizations and rewarded key bureaucrats and military figures for loyalty. A significant portion also funded gift-giving and vote-buying (Kang 2002a: 99). As democratization proceeded funds were slipped to opposition leaders in order to keep them compliant (Pye 1997: 220). In return chaebols got access to capital and foreign exchange on preferential terms, light regulation, and labor peace guaranteed by state power. Elite Cartels produced both wealth and control: stability attracted investment, and presidents could reward development “winners,” making productivity and export growth, as well as loyalty, keys to admission to the cartel.

Democratization changed the dynamics of corruption in some ways but by no means eradicated it. Kim Young-Sam, winner of the first competitive civilian presidential election, took office in 1993 as a reformer. He mandated investigations of “money politics” under predecessor Roh Tae Woo, inquiries that eventually included the leaders of the top 30 chaebols. Nine businessmen were indicted, and five convicted; Roh himself was convicted and sentenced to jail. Kim Dae-Jung, later the first opposition candidate to become president, accepted $2.

Download

Copyright Disclaimer:
This site does not store any files on its server. We only index and link to content provided by other sites. Please contact the content providers to delete copyright contents if any and email us, we'll remove relevant links or contents immediately.